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ABSTRACT 
COMMITMENT AND TEMPORAL MEDIATION IN KORSGAARD’S SELF-
CONSTITUTION 
 
by 
 
David Shope 
 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Hinchman 
 
 
In Self-Constitution Christine Korsgaard argues that our reasons are public. What she 
means by this is that if a rational agent has a reason to perform some action, it is a reason 
that has normative force for everyone who is a rational agent. Korsgaard also argues in 
Self-Constitution that when we will a course of action, we must do so in the form of a 
determinate commitment. Doing so requires determining some reasons to be bad reasons 
to opt out of the course of action that we will. Finally, Korsgaard claims that the selves 
occupying our own body at different times are distinct agents unless their wills are 
unified. In this paper, I will argue that Korsgaard’s views about diachronic identity 
produce tensions between her claims that reasons are public and that volition involves 
determinate commitment. If reasons are public, then my future self’s reasons whatever 
they may be cannot be preemptively dismissed as bad reasons. Yet, in order to commit 
ourselves to a determinate course of action through our wills, Korsgaard claims that this 
is precisely what we must do. The only way for Korsgaard to resolve this conflict 
between her claims is to argue that the form of commitment she describes is a necessary 
iii 
 
form of mediation between the reasons of agents occupying the same body at different 
times. I will consider an argument that mediating in this manner is necessary for the 
efficacious pursuit of our ends, and therefore required by the constitutive features of 
agency. I will show that this argument is unsuccessful in establishing that such a strategy 
of diachronic coordination is required to pursue our ends and that, further, such a strategy 
will impinge upon autonomy of agents subject to it since it allows the deliberating self to 
arbitrarily establish restrictions on the reasons its future self might be motivated by.  
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Introduction 
 Christine Korsgaard has developed a Kantian account of agency that places 
sociality at the foundation of all rational action. Her account of diachronic action most 
vividly portrays this: on Korsgaard's account the self that wills some action at a time and 
the self that carries it out at another time are not the same self, even if they share the same 
body, except inasmuch as their wills are unified. The selves occupying my body have to 
share projects if they are going to get anything done. This is not for Korsgaard just a 
thesis about the persistence of personal identity. It plays a crucial role in her argument 
that the Categorical Imperative is constitutive of action.  
 More broadly, Korsgaard takes reasons to be universal or, in her terms, public. 
Any reasons aren't just mine, they're yours too and vice-versa. This comes out most 
strongly when Korsgaard compares the lack of privacy of reasons with Wittgenstein's 
argument against private language. Korsgaard suggests that normativity permeates the 
social to such a degree that "by calling out your name, I have obligated you, I have given 
you a reason to stop."
1
 In my life as an agent, I encounter reasons all around me, reasons 
that are reasons because others take them to be. It is not merely that reasons are public in 
the same way the world is public, there to be found by anyone who would look. Rather, 
Korsgaard thinks that reasons result from our reflective endorsement of maxims for 
action and so reasons are only to be found in the domain of interacting rational agents. I 
will describe her account in somewhat more detail in Section I and then most fully in 
Section V, but it is important to bear in mind that Korsgaard thinks normativity is literally 
willed into being by rational agents, albeit with certain constraints on what counts as 
volition. 
                                                 
1
 Korsgaard 1996, 140. 
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 In the following sections I will attempt to clarify Korsgaard's argument for her 
claim that reasons are public in this manner. Korsgaard argues in three steps. The first 
two steps of her argument for the publicity of reasons establish a certain kind of public 
availability of reasons but do not support her stronger claims that reasons are public in 
that they make demands of us by default. The first part of the argument establishes the 
claim that my reasons must be formulated in a manner such that they are available to 
others by taking on the law-like form of a determinate commitment, thus grounding the 
possibility of volitional unity. The second part establishes the claim that there is no basis 
on which the incentives on which others with whom I am interacting are operating can be 
excluded as potential grounds for my own practical deliberations and that, therefore, there 
is no pre-deliberative class of reasons which is uniquely mine. Both of these steps ensure 
that public reasons are possible. In the final step, Korsgaard argues that it is necessary for 
our reasons to be public since that is the only way to interact and interacting is necessary 
for any action at all. Here, Korsgaard claims that in order to cooperate with other agents, 
we must deliberate from a standpoint of mutual respect for our capacity to legislate (what 
Korsgaard calls our humanity). She then suggests that because, as she shows in the first 
step of her argument, all action requires cooperation with at least future selves occupying 
one's body we must always act from a respect for humanity and that there is no way of 
privately demarcating humanity to respect: it belongs to all agents. Thus, since respect for 
humanity requires treating others' reasons as normative for us, we must reason publicly if 
we are to act at all. The result is that, much in the same way that through friendship or 
marriage each participant takes on the other’s projects as their own, we must take on the 
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projects of other human agents as our own because we are constitutively committed to 
treat our wills as unified with theirs through our common humanity.  
 However, a concern arises once Korsgaard has got her argument on the table. She 
appeals specifically to the case of diachronic action in order to argue that reasons are 
public because diachronic action is inescapable. Her model of public reasoning as shared 
deliberation seems like it could not apply in the diachronic case: past and future selves 
are not present to each other in a way that would allow them to deliberate together and 
come to a shared conclusion which they endorse simultaneously. Therefore, some sort of 
policy needs to be in effect governing how, across time, we ensure that we act in a 
coherent manner while still respecting the publicity of reasons. In the context of temporal 
separation there appear to be only two options: either the past self lets the future self 
decide, which undermines the determinacy of commitment which Korsgaard presents as 
an essential feature of volition in the first step of her argument or the future self lets the 
past self decide, which seems to require that the determinate commitments we create 
through our volitions can justifiably preempt the judgments of one’s future selves. 
Furthermore, whatever policy binds us across time it must be either one or the other. The 
policy in which future self lets the past self decide cannot gain its authority from any past 
self’s commitment to it: otherwise, one would antecedently commit the future self to 
accepting the authority of antecedent commitment. Thus, if our volitions are determinate 
commitments they must be so constitutively: it must be a part of the nature of volition 
that it takes the form of determinate commitment. 
 I will argue that our volitions being determinate commitments cannot, on 
Korsgaard’s account, be constitutive of our agency. There is some appeal to the policy of 
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treating our volitions as committing us inasmuch as doing so would give us normative 
authority to pursue our ends in a temporally extended manner even in spite of preference 
shifts which might constitute competing judgments. However, this commitment is not 
strictly necessary in order to be able to act. This is most plain, I will argue, when we 
consider that we are capable of acting across time even when unanticipated circumstances 
place us outside the realm of circumstance in which our commitments tell us what to do. 
Since we are finite agents, our capacity to commit ourselves is always limited. If 
commitment is necessary for action, then we are frequently failing to act.  
 The outline of this paper is this: in Section I, I will give an overview of the 
foundation of Korsgaard’s account of agency; In Section II, I will present Korsgaard’s 
account of public reasons briefly, so that the progression of her argument is clearer. In 
Section III, I will present the first step of her argument; In Section IV, I will present the 
second step of her argument; In Section V, I will argue a crucial point: that for 
Korsgaard, we must unify not only our incentives under principles of volition, but our 
principles of volition into a coherent whole. The result is that the unification of wills is an 
all-or-nothing affair, even in cases of interpersonal interaction. In Section VI, I will 
present the final step of Korsgaard’s argument. Lastly, in Section VII I will consider 
whether or not volition is constitutively determinate commitment and argue that it is not.  
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I. Agency as Self-Constitution 
 I will begin with Korsgaard's account of non-human animal agency, as it helps 
illustrate the way in which Korsgaard thinks our agency is tied up with principles of 
action. On Korsgaard's account, animals represent the world through perception in a way 
that construes the features of that world as calling for certain responses: "The world as 
perceived by the animal is organized around his interests: it consists of the animal's food, 
his enemies, his potential mates, and, if he is social, of his fellows, his family, flock, tribe 
or what have you."
2
 Animals possess instincts which manifest as dispositions which lead 
it to perceive and respond to the environment in a certain manner, governed by the 
function of that animal: the preservation and reproduction of its form.  
 However, in the case of human beings there is another level at play in the 
relationship between our representations of the world and our actions. According to 
Korsgaard, we human beings "are aware not only that we desire or fear certain things, but 
also that we are inclined to act in certain ways on the basis of those desires or fears."
3
 
This results in what Korsgaard calls reflective distance, the space in which questions of 
justification arise. We have to decide whether or not we count the incentives presented to 
us by our instincts as reasons. The result is that "instincts no longer determine how we 
respond to those incentives, what we do in the face of them."
4
 Since the instincts no 
longer determine our actions, Korsgaard claims we need principles, what she calls 
maxims, in order to settle what will count as reasons. These principles replace our 
instincts in constituting our form as agents.  
                                                 
2
 Korsgaard 2009, 110 
3
 Ibid, p. 116 
4
 Ibid. 
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 Korsgaard argues that there are two aspects to human agency under this 
description. First, the principles of action we endorse must take the form of a law. To will 
a principle as a law means that when we will that principle we are making ourselves into 
a cause which will bring about the goal contained in our principle.
5
 In order to do this 
coherently, we must to will the means to that goal as a part of the action we undertake. 
Korsgaard takes these features of actions to be expressions of the fact that the categorical 
imperative in the formulation of universal law is constitutive of human action. In other 
words, we have to act on principles possessing these features in order to act because on 
Korsgaard's account, those very principles form our make-up as agents. This is the 
fundamental constitutive norm of human agency, but it is a merely formal constraint. We 
must also have particular principles that we adopt directing us at particular ends. This is 
the second feature of our agency, tied to our animal nature. The positive content of our 
actions must come from outside the formal constraints of our agency. In fact, Korsgaard 
claims all our non-moral values come from our incentives, which is to say our instincts. 
Thus, as agents we are still working with the materials that our constitutions as animals 
provide.  
The reason why Korsgaard thinks we need principles is that when the grounds for 
action naturally provided for us by instinct fall away in the face of reflective distance, we 
need new grounds for action. Since our actions are no longer immediately governed by 
our experience of the world as organized around our preservation as animals, we have to 
reconstitute ourselves as causes under a different form. However, in the case of human 
                                                 
5
 The reason 'being-the-cause-of' is connected with lawfulness on Korsgaard's picture is its Kantian 
heritage. In the same way that natural laws define causal relations, the laws we give ourselves are supposed 
to define causal relations. When we give ourselves laws we are the cause.  
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beings Korsgaard thinks our forms are up to us. Therefore, rather than operating on 
instinctive principles of action, we formulate maxims which represent what courses of 
action we reflectively endorse. The principles of action we endorse are what constitute us 
as agents. The reason why we must endorse principles rather than, say, one-off behaviors 
is that Korsgaard thinks there is no other way to constitute one's self as an agent at a time 
unless one endorses a principle which is available to all rational agents. It is in her 
argument for this claim, the claim that we must act under laws we give ourselves that the 
argument for public reasons begins. 
II. The Publicity of Reasons: An Overview 
 In this section I will provide an overview of Korsgaard's claims that reasons are 
public, primarily by considering her discussion of the issue in the chapter "Integrity and 
Interaction" from Self-Constitution. 
 In the chapter "Integrity and Interaction" Korsgaard provides an account of public 
reasons, arguing that in interactions with other agents reasons are shared. In the context 
of a violent property dispute, Korsgaard illustrates the way the universalization 
requirement of the Categorical Imperative differs between private and public accounts of 
reasons:  
I think I have a reason to shoot you, so that I can get the object. On the private conception 
of reasons, universalizability commits me to thinking you also have a reason to shoot me, 
so that you can get the object... but on the public conception of reasons, we do not get this 
result. On the public conception I must take your reasons for my own.
6
 
 Naturally, willing both that I shoot you and that you shoot me in order for me to get the 
object produces a practical contradiction and so I cannot will to shoot the other person in 
order to obtain the object on a public account of reasons. Korsgaard's claim here boils 
                                                 
6
 Ibid, 193 
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down to the following: "if personal interaction is to be possible, we must reason together, 
and this means that I must treat your reasons, as I will put it, as reasons, that is, as 
considerations that have normative force for me as well as you."
7
 
 Korsgaard makes stronger assertions later: "We can't choose to treat someone's 
reasons as reasons, as considerations with normative force for us... responding to 
another's reasons as normative is the default position--just like hearing another's words as 
meaningful is the default position."
8
 It is this stronger articulation of the publicity of 
reasons that will be the main issue in this paper. 
 One important feature of Korsgaard's account is that interaction occurs in all cases 
of diachronic action. At minimum, all action across time is a kind of interaction among 
successive agents occupying a body. Korsgaard puts the matter quite plainly:  
The requirements of unifying your agency internally are the same as the requirements for 
unifying your agency with that of others. that's why you have to will universally, because 
the reason you act on now, the law you make for yourself now, must be one you can will 
to act on again later, come what may, unless you come to see there's a good way to 
change it.
9
  
For Korsgaard, diachronic action of any sort requires public reasoning. For, one is not a 
united self until after the will is united across the selves occupying one's body and wills 
can only be united through the recognition of public reasons. To illustrate, Korsgaard 
discusses the scenario of the Russian nobleman. 
 The Russian nobleman, in his youth, is confronted with a difficulty: while at 
present his ideals and values suggest to him that he should redistribute his wealth to 
others, he knows that as he becomes older he will become more conservative. He 
                                                 
7
 Ibid, 192 
8
 Ibid, 202 
9
 Ibid, 203 
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undertakes to establish a contract, which he leaves in the control of his wife that will bind 
his future self to undertaking the plan of redistribution. On Korsgaard's account, this sort 
of behavior can only express a breakdown in volition: the Russian nobleman "expects to 
change his mind without a reason."
10
 Hence, the nobleman cannot be a unified agent in 
the undertaking of the wealth redistribution. There is a failure of action present. 
Korsgaard describes this failure in different ways: either as the failure of the young 
nobleman to take his older self's reasons as his own or as a failure of the older nobleman 
to take the young nobleman's reasons as his own. Both are, assuming the young 
nobleman's prediction is correct, failing to recognize reasons as public. Thus, for 
Korsgaard the very structure of diachronic action requires the publicity of reasons 
because interaction requires the publicity of reasons and all diachronic action just is a 
kind of interaction.   
 It is important to note that Korsgaard takes the claim others' reasons have on us to 
be defeasible: "[The young nobleman] can decide to disagree with his own future 
attitude. But unless he is then prepared to regard his own future attitude as one of 
weakness or irrationality, he is not according the reason he himself proposes to act on 
right now as having a normative standing."
11
 If there is reason to doubt another agent as a 
rational source with respect to reasons, then I need not take their reasons for my own. 
This opens up the question as to what amounts to being mistaken or irrational on 
Korsgaard's account. This means that to understand the sense in which Korsgaard wants 
there to be a default inclusion of other agents' reasons in my own deliberative process, we 
will need to settle her account of the norms of agency. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Korsgaard 
                                                 
10
 Ibid 
11
 Ibid 
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takes the fundamental norms of agency to play an important role in grounding the 
publicity of reasons, so to even have a full grasp of what Korsgaard means by calling our 
reasons public one must understand this feature of her account. The publicity of reasons 
is an expression of their universality, which is a result of the fact that agency not only 
must comply with the categorical imperative
12
 but is constituted by reflective 
endorsement constrained by it. Korsgaard not only justifies but characterizes the 
categorical imperative in terms of the same sociality that underlies not only cooperation 
with others, but cooperation with the selves occupying one's body across time. The link is 
with efficacy in action, which amounts to efficacy in the formation of unified volitions. 
 Here we can see the issue that will concern us later in Section VII: exactly how do 
our diachronic self-relations work? What are the defeasibility conditions exactly? For 
instance, what does it amount to for the Russian nobleman to consider his future attitude 
as one of weakness? What role does the Russian nobleman’s anticipation of his older 
self’s reasons play in his deliberation? On the one hand, Korsgaard seems to suggest that 
the Russian nobleman must cooperate with his future self unless his future self’s 
judgment can be seen as irrational. But the only norms governing the rationality of 
agency on Korsgaard’s accounts are the norms governing self-constitution. Thus it seems 
that the Russian nobleman cannot commit himself to giving his wealth away unless he 
thinks that to do otherwise would be in violation of the constitutive norms of agency. Yet, 
as we will see in the next section, along the way to arguing for the publicity of reasons, 
Korsgaard suggests that commitment is constitutive of volition.    
                                                 
12
 Korsgaard thinks that the hypothetical imperative is not a distinct principle from the categorical 
imperative, so inasmuch as the features of the categorical imperative are most relevant for her account of 
the publicity of reasons, I will only be focusing on it.  
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III. Diachronic Cooperation and the Categorical Imperative 
 To be an agent for Korsgaard is to be autonomous: to give one's self laws. On 
Korsgaard's account the actions we will contain an end goal and the required means to get 
at that end goal. An action takes the form of what Kant would call a maxim: "to-do-x-for-
the-sake-of-y." This is the general form of any willed maxim. Maxims are principles of 
action, and we need maxims because we are reflective: we need to give reasons and 
justify when deciding on what to do. The reason we need reasons, according to 
Korsgaard, is because our self-consciousness allows us to reflect. Without self-
consciousness, we would be moved to behave as a result of any incentives presented to us 
but "it is within the space of reflective distance that the question whether our incentives 
give us reasons arises."
13
 This question arises because the reflective standpoint is one of 
justification. Now, in order to provide justification "we need principles, which determine 
what we are to count as reasons."
14
 Without reflectivity, we don't have justification and 
so normativity isn't even in the picture yet. But, for Korsgaard we need principles in order 
to answer the challenge of justification. Those principles are maxims.  
 For Korsgaard there are two key features of maxims. First, maxims take the form 
of a law. Second, they are universal. To will a maxim as a law means that when we will 
that maxim we are making ourselves into a cause which will bring about the goal 
contained in our maxim. In order to do this coherently, we will also have to will the 
means to that goal as a part of the action we undertake. The maxim that we will in 
undertaking an action must also be universal, which is to say that it should be able to be 
willed by any and all rational agents. Korsgaard takes both these features of actions to be 
                                                 
13
 Korsgaard 2009, 116 
14
 Ibid 
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expressions of the fact that both the hypothetical and categorical imperatives as Kant 
described them are constitutive of action. The claim that the categorical imperative is 
constitutive of action is crucial in support Korsgaard's ultimate argument that reasons are 
public. If actions were not governed by principles, as the categorical imperative demands, 
then reasons would not be able to be shared in the first place since there would be no 
possibility of multiple agents acting on the same maxim. The generality of the principles 
of volition which the categorical imperative demands is precisely what allows for 
multiple agents to adopt the same principle and therefore to share their reasons.  
 Korsgaard, therefore, argues that our maxims must take the form of a universal 
law, which is to say that they must conform to the categorical imperative. The maxim 
Korsgaard takes as an example is that of going to the dentist to have a cavity filled. 
Willing the maxim universally means that "I commit myself to acting as this maxim 
specifies -- going to the dentist on the occasion of my appointment --... so long as I still 
have both the cavity and the appointment, and unless there is a good reason why not."
15
 
In order to be universal the maxim has to somehow generalize.
16
 In spite of changing 
conditions, I commit myself to acting as the maxim demands assuming the relevant 
requirements are met. In this case, one of the relevant requirements is having a cavity. 
However, Korsgaard thinks there can be others. This is her motivation for including the 
italicized clause. The clause "unless there is a good reason why not" expresses that 
maxims we will are what Korsgaard calls 'provisionally universal.'  
                                                 
15
 Korsgaard 2006, 61 
16
 Korsgaard uses the term 'general' to describe a particular sort of principle which is distinct from universal 
principles. This technical use of the term will be irrelevant to our discussion, so my use of it will be that of 
ordinary English.  
13 
 
 
 
 If it is the case that willing maxims as universal laws is constitutive of action as 
Korsgaard claims then in order to will to go to the dentist to fill a cavity I will have to 
will my maxim by committing myself to it as a provisionally universal law. But why 
should I do that?  According to Korsgaard, it is because if I don't will it universally I can't 
be said to have made a commitment and if I haven't made any sort of commitment to my 
maxim "then I have not really willed anything."
17
 For instance "it may be that I am really 
terrified of the dentist and therefore I am always tempted to find some excuse not to go 
when the day arrives. Now if I am prepared to give up the project of going to the dentist 
in the face of any consideration whatever that tempts me to do so, then clearly I have not 
really committed myself to anything."
18
 My maxim has to generalize across potential 
situations such that it applies to some situations and not others. It has to have determinate 
contours that establish when it is appropriate to act in certain ways and when it is not. 
Otherwise, it would make no determinate demands and would not amount to a 
commitment of any sort. Once my maxim has this universal character it becomes 
available to other agents. It is a rule they could potentially follow just as much as I could 
since its generality allows it to apply just as well to situations they may find themselves 
in. Put another way, it is not limited to just my particular situation because my particular 
situation isn't going to persist. In virtue of my maxim's generality it is, in a sense, public 
inasmuch as others can follow the same maxim. Korsgaard also argues that unless my 
maxim or reason can be available to any other rational agent as a potential normative 
standard in this manner, there can be no cases of volitional unity across time. The reason 
                                                 
17
 Korsgaard 2006, 61 
18
 Ibid, 62 
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for this is that Korsgaard maintains that "the self is constituted by volition."
19
 So, "when I 
will to go to the dentist on the day of my appointment, I cannot be willing a law that my 
future self should go to the dentist, for whether I have a future self depends on whether 
that law and others like it are obeyed.”20 
 This sudden talk of future selves might seem out of place, but its appearance here 
is quite natural. Korsgaard can best demonstrate that our maxims must be available to 
other agents by demonstrating that even when our volitions do not stray any further than 
home-base (our body) they are required to be available to other agents. Otherwise, a 
counterexample to her contention that all maxims are available in this manner would be 
cases where I will a maxim such that I only need to directly involve myself in following it 
and it seems that many candidates would be available if I had an independently persisting 
self. If all cases of action require maxims to take the form of universal laws then it is 
crucial that future agents occupying my body cannot be identified with me prior to their 
taking on my volitions as their own.  
 Let's try and make this a little clearer. If I will to go to the dentist to get a cavity 
filled, this decision is going to be prospective because the action I undertake will need to 
be carried out during some period of time after the action has been willed. But the agents 
responsible for carrying out that action can't be the same as me prior to their following 
through on the same willed maxim since our being the same agent depends on being able 
to share in our wills. Thus when I intend to go to the dentist I have to will a maxim, 
giving my action a form such that it is available to another agent as standard that that 
                                                 
19
 Ibid, 64 
20
 Ibid 
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agent can either reject or conform to. If I will my maxim only for myself, then I can't truly 
will it because I would not be able to coherently intend it to be followed through over a 
period of time. I would not be willing it for the future agents occupying my body. 
Actually, it's not just future agents occupying my body that I need to be concerned about, 
it's also myself. Korsgaard holds that willing maxims universally is not just necessary in 
order to establish the identity of agents across time, it is necessary in order to establish 
the unity of any given agent at one time.
21
 It is only through identifying with a law in the 
form of a maxim that allows me to constitute myself as an agent distinct from the 
impulses that would otherwise determine my behavior. The maxim not only secures the 
possibility for commitment given alterations in my incentives and motivations across 
time, it secures the possibility for commitment now in spite of competing incentives and 
motivations.    
 Korsgaard holds that willing maxims universally is not just necessary in order to 
guarantee the diachronic unity of agency, it is necessary in order to guarantee the 
synchronic unity of the agent as well. It is only through identifying with a law in the form 
a maxim that I can constitute myself as an agent distinct from the impulses that would 
otherwise determine my behavior. The maxim not only secures the possibility for 
commitment given alterations in my incentives and motivations across time, it secures the 
possibility for commitment now in spite of competing incentives and motivations. If I did 
not identify with a principle in contrast to my inclinations, then it seems like there are 
two possibilities. First, that I do not identify with a principle because I don't have one, in 
which case it seems like I am not operating reflectively at all and cannot be taken to be a 
                                                 
21
 It's more accurate to say that willing maxims universally is necessary in order to establish the existence 
of an agent, since for Korsgaard agents constitute themselves by willing. 
16 
 
 
 
full-blooded human agent. For, in order to totally avoid willing a maxim I will have to 
simply and straightforwardly act by following some particular inclination since my 
inclinations are the only other available source of action.  Second, that I treat the 
principle as distinct from me, in which case Korsgaard claims that I would effectively be 
turning it into "another force" equivalent to my competing incentives.
22
 This leaves me 
still to choose, among the options, how I identify.  
 What is important to take away from this discussion is that for Korsgaard it is a 
constraint on a willed maxim that it be willed universally. So, if my maxim does not 
universalize, it cannot coherently be the endorsement of a reason. Another way of putting 
the constraint is as follows: I can only will to do x for some reason if I could will that 
anyone do x for that reason. The next step in Korsgaard's argument for the publicity of 
reasons is to argue that since agents must constitute their identities according to 
principles of a universal form, the reasons I endorse when I will a maxim are public. We 
have to transition from a universalization of reasons that are private, where endorsing that 
toothaches are reasons for going to the dentist means when I have a toothache I have a 
reason to take myself to the dentist and when you have a toothache you have a reason to 
take yourself to the dentist, to a universalization of reasons that are public, where 
endorsing that toothaches are reasons for going to the dentist means that when you have a 
toothache it is also a reason for me to take you to the dentist and vice-versa
23
. 
 There is an ambiguity here which we will have to concern ourselves with once 
we’ve reached the standpoint of public reasoning. Maxims may be a kind of commitment, 
                                                 
22
 Korsgaard 2009, 75 
23
 Of course, it doesn’t have to be an overriding reason. Plus, considerations about how to divvy up labor 
among our public reasons may prevent counterintuitive results such as the suggestion that we handle any 
tasks on our own. 
17 
 
 
 
a law which governs how I behave if a particular situation occurs, but I may interact with 
those that endorse different maxims. What is ambiguous is whether or not the 
commitment that Korsgaard thinks is essential for maxims is a commitment to the maxim 
or a commitment to act a certain way insofar as I endorse the maxim. She seems to talk 
as if in the diachronic case, it is something like the former whereas in the case of 
interpersonal deliberations with other agents she can only mean the latter since I will 
have to come to a shared decision with the agents I interact with which takes into account 
my maxims and theirs, and which may involve the endorsement of some other maxim. 
The concern to be dealt with in Section VII is whether or not Korsgaard can treat the 
diachronic case distinctly from the interpersonal case.  
 Before I proceed to the next section, it is also worth commenting on the 
relationship between the example of the toothache and the Russian Nobleman. When 
Korsgaard argues for that volition requires determinate commitment, she seems to be 
addressing cases of temptation and attempting to show how succumbing to temptation 
involves some form of what she calls ‘particularistic willing’. Particularistic willing is the 
identification with a particular instance of inclination (for instance, fear) rather than a 
maxim with the form of a universal law. On the other hand, the Russian Nobleman case is 
not one of temptation, or at least need not be, as the shift in preferences between the 
nobleman’s younger and older self is presumed to be an enduring one and, further, the 
older Nobleman’s views about property are based not on a devotion to local impulse, but 
to a conscious self-preservation or greed. It is presumable that the older nobleman is 
working from a set of maxims that he endorses. However, the Russian Nobleman is a 
case in which it seems much more apparent that the past and future selves are different 
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people and so seems more intuitively to be a case of interpersonal rather than 
intrapersonal relations. In the final section of this paper, I will consider a case which does 
not involve particularistic willing but which involves an endorsement of a maxim which 
competes with the maxim willed by the past self, yet is not as intuitively interpersonal as 
the Russian Nobleman case. The question will be: whether or not Korsgaard’s claims 
about the way in which volition commits us can have implications for cases outside of 
particularistic willing
24. Given her talk of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ reasons, it sounds as though 
she thinks that our maxims commit our future selves even when they do not will 
particularistically (since such willing does not produce genuine reasons). Examining such 
a case more closely, I will argue, shows that our volitions cannot do so if reasons are 
public.  
 In the next section I will consider Korsgaard's second step in her argument for the 
publicity of reasons as presented in the Chapter "Integrity and Interaction." This 
argument should help supplement her arguments that the categorical imperative is 
constitutive of action, making clear why the constraints of interaction demand a 
universalization of public reasons rather than a universalization of private reasons.  
IV. The Argument from Deliberative Neutrality 
 The argument presented in "Practical Reason and Unity of the Will" constrains 
the form of the reasons that we can will according to the categorical imperative, namely 
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that they take the form of a law which, in virtue of its general nature, can be taken on by 
other agents in a united will. This is not, however, a complete account of the publicity of 
reasons. As Korsgaard considers in "Integrity and Interaction", the universal form of 
maxims seems consistent with an account of reasons that is essentially private. This 
would imply that even when I take having a toothache to be a reason for me to go to the 
dentist, other people's toothaches aren't reasons for me to take any action (though I might 
will a maxim that would suggest that). In contrast, Korsgaard claims that if reasons are 
public then my willing our example maxim commits me willing that you should go to the 
dentist. If I take a toothache to be a reason to go the dentist, I take it to be a reason in a 
public manner: binding for everyone. The implication here is that I am bound to help you 
go to the dentist when you have a toothache. Of course, there are many, many other 
competing reasons which may override this reason, but your toothache is still a reason 
which makes demands of me as much as it makes demands of you.  
 Korsgaard's argument that reasons are public in this manner appeals to the fact 
that she takes human agents to constitute their own identities. Since human agents must 
reflectively endorse a principle in order to constitute their agency, there is no identity of 
the agent to speak of prior to the endorsement of some principle. Korsgaard thinks this 
fact means that there is no basis on which reasons could be grouped into 'mine' and 
'yours' when engaging in practical deliberation. Here is the argument: 
We constitute our own identities. So what counts as me,  my incentives, my reasons, my 
identity, depends on rather than precedes, the kinds of choices I make. So I can't just 
decide I will base my choices only on my own reasons: because that category--the 
category of incentives that counts as mine and from which I construct "my reasons"--gets 
its ultimate shape from the choices that I make.
25
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The idea appears to be something like this: maxims pick out what incentives count as 
reasons, but there is no class of incentives that would count as mine prior to establishing 
what maxims I endorse. Therefore, I can't pick out ones that will be 'mine' as opposed to 
'yours'. 
 This seems convincing, but it doesn't seem to quite establish a way of counting 
reasons that is universal. For perhaps there is no set of reasons which is definitively first-
personal from my perspective as an agent, but that doesn't prevent me from arbitrarily 
picking out certain incentives on the basis that they arise, say, from my particular body.  
 Korsgaard considers this concern and gives a response in a footnote:  
 Suppose I call my body 'Korsgaard' and I decide that I am going to attend only to the 
 reasons arising directly from Korsgaard's thoughts and experiences, or something along 
 those lines. That seems possible. But then I would have to be prepared to will it as a 
 universal law that I should attend only to those reasons even if I turned out not  to be 
 Korsgaard.
26
 
 The universal form of the laws that I will dictate that, while I can pick out a set of 
incentives that are restricted to particular embodied agents, the self which is to carry out 
the law I will cannot be arbitrarily restricted in this manner. In other words, the agent to 
which the incentives count as reasons can never be restricted to particular creatures, 
bodies or what-have-you. The agential self which carries out the maxim is identified with 
that maxim and so prior to its formation there is nothing to identify it with outside of the 
mere form of rational agency. Hence, whether or not Korsgaard is an agent in her own 
body, when she wills a maxim that takes the incentives originating in 'Korsgaard' as 
reasons, she is bound to take them as reasons.  
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 It should be apparent that we are not, at this stage in Korsgaard's argument, to the 
publicity of reasons. Korsgaard wants the default to be that we treat others' reasons as 
normative for us, but we aren't there yet. Before we reach the final step of her argument 
for this conclusion, I want to consider an ambiguity on Korsgaard's account of agency: it 
is not at all clear how another's reasons ever could be normative for me if my identity is 
just constituted by the principle I endorse. I will only have the same reasons as another if 
we endorse the same principle. However, in virtue of endorsing the same principle, 
Korsgaard's commitment to the view that agents are only identified with the principles of 
action they endorse renders the result that we are no longer distinct agents. So, we ought 
to get clear on just what Korsgaard is going to want to argue for when she claims that 
others’ reasons are binding on me by default. I will consider this issue in the following 
section, showing why Korsgaard must claim that the publicity of reasons can only result 
from a wholly shared volitional identity. 
V. Pluralities of Agents and Pluralities of Principles 
When considering what it means on Korsgaard's constitutive account of agency, 
to be bound by another's reasons we may want to ask another question: to what degree is 
it necessary to endorse the same principles as another agent in order to count as sharing 
reasons? For, in response to the all-or-nothing way in which we posed the difficulty, we 
might object something along the following lines: you and I can share in our reasons 
without being the same agent inasmuch as we mutually endorse a particular maxim, say 
the maxim of going to the dentist in case of a toothache. However, we also have many 
other maxims which we endorse which allow us to be distinct. While this will not get us 
to Korsgaard's claim that others reasons are normative to us by default it will allow us to 
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coherently conceive of others' reasons as normative for us in cases where we endorse 
some number of identical maxims. 
 I do not think this is a feasible response. The most significant problem with it is 
that it creates a problem which Korsgaard's account of agency does not have the 
resources to answer. Suppose that you and I endorse a plurality of principles, some of 
which overlap. What allows us to say that a certain set of those principles is mine and the 
other set is yours? We have to proceed very cautiously here for, on Korsgaard's account, 
there is no agential identity prior to endorsement. Agents are identified with the 
principles they endorse. One might have the kneejerk response: well, fine then, I am 
identified with this plurality and you are identified with that plurality. This still implies 
that there is some way to index an 'I' and a 'you' that underlies each plurality, attaches to 
them, to make them distinct. But as Korsgaard has to insist in her argument that reasons 
are public, we don't have the resources for that. The only way to identify agents is by 
their principles and prior to the act of endorsement there is no 'me' and 'you' to which 
principles could be divvied up.
27
 Put another way, it doesn't seem as though on 
Korsgaard's account we can cogently talk about pluralities of principles all endorsed by 
one agent. In such a situation we would merely have a plurality of agents, each identified 
with each individual principle which has been endorsed. Thus a case of partial unity of 
will, a sort of overlap, will be impossible.  
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 Fortunately, Korsgaard is not stuck with an account of agency which will leave us 
all a large jumble of agents each operating on a distinct principle. Korsgaard takes the 
unity of agency to be central to her account and thus the obvious response for her is that 
when we will a plurality of maxims, we will them as a single maxim. That is to say, so 
long as we are taking them as normative for ourselves, the set of reasons they determine 
will all be normative for us simultaneously. If the agent is identified only with the 
principle it has endorsed, and we pick out the principle in terms of the action-reason pairs 
which it makes normative then the simultaneous normativity of a set of reasons which 
could be described in terms of a plurality of principles really is, from the agential 
standpoint, only one principle. This might seem like a view we would want to resist, 
since it seems natural to talk about a plurality of principles of action (after all, we don't 
cite every reason we've got when we explain why we've gone to see the dentist, just our 
toothache).  All I can say is that Korsgaard will not want to resist it for fear of 
decomposing agency into a disunified jumbled of principles. It's also worth pointing out 
that our natural way of talking could just as easily treat the sorts of principles we are 
inclined to talk about as really being a plurality of principles. For instance, the maxim "I 
will go to the dentist when I have a toothache" could be decomposed into a plurality of 
principles: "I will go to the dentist when I have a toothache on Monday and I will go to 
the dentist when I have a toothache on Tuesday and etc..." Sometimes, this is the level at 
which we talk, especially if someone is puzzled as to why we went to the dentist at a 
particular time. There may still be something to be said about our common ways of 
describing action justifications at certain levels, but the issues here are too weighty for 
Korsgaard's account of agency for features of our language to be convincing without 
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further argument that our principles typically have certain 'natural sizes' aligning with 
common discourse.  
 All of this will lead us to a conclusion Korsgaard wants to endorse, though it is 
not quite the strongest form of the publicity of reasons. Korsgaard claims that 
interpersonal interactions, cases of cooperative agency, require the cooperating agents to 
treat each other's reasons as normative. This is because she takes cases of interaction to 
involve a unification of wills. If the unification of wills cannot be partial, as the above 
considerations seem to suggest, then unifying my will with someone else's means taking 
on board all of their reasons and vice-versa. There will be no way to pull apart just some 
principles and leave the rest. All of the other agent's reasons must come aboard. If 
diachronic action involves interaction with other agents, then it will be the case that we 
are also tasked with this project of unification. The difference is that my future selves 
don’t exist yet, and so I cannot actively negotiate in order to reach some agreed, 
mediating principle that will govern our shared activity. The result is that self-governance 
will have to occur according to some principle that allows for the coherence of our 
actions across time in spite of our limited capacities to negotiate or to anticipate the 
reasons our future selves have. This principle will have to fall out of the constitutive 
norms of agency. Were it optional it would be possible that my later self would not 
endorse it, and then I would need to mediate between the principle of diachronic self-
governance I endorse and the one my later self endorses and I could not appeal to the 
same policy. Whatever new policy I appeal to would have to be non-optional or the same 
problem would result.  This is the conundrum I will consider in Section VII. 
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 Now, it seems like the path to getting the strong sense in which reasons are public 
is becoming clearer. Korsgaard needs to establish two things: that all interaction must 
involve a unification of wills, second that the interactive stance is necessary in order to 
will. In the next section I will present Korsgaard's argument in favor of both these claims.  
VI. The Final Step 
Korsgaard's argument that the interaction of agents always involves the 
unification of wills rests on the claim that interaction "depends on the possibility of 
shared deliberation."
28
 It is the possibility of shared deliberation that Korsgaard claims 
depends on the public status of reasons. Without the possibility that reasons can possess a 
normativity that "can extend across the boundaries between people"
29
 interaction would 
be impossible. 
 Korsgaard gives a number of concrete examples to illustrate what she has in mind. 
The first example she gives is that of a student and teacher organizing a time to meet. The 
student and teacher have different constraints on when they could meet. For instance, the 
teacher can meet right after the class in which she teaches the student but the student has 
a class immediately afterwards and so cannot meet at that time. Since the act of meeting 
is a mutual one, Korsgaard wants to claim that teacher and student must deliberate 
together and so must share reasons.  
 Korsgaard rejects one possibility: one in which the teacher retorts to the student 
that she just needs to skip the class which interferes with the suggested meeting time. 
Korsgaard dismisses this case very quickly as a case in which interaction does not occur 
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at all. Certainly, the student and teacher are not deliberating together in this case. Further, 
they are only acting together inasmuch as the student acquiesces and takes the teachers' 
reasons to be normative, thereby abandoning treating class attendance as a reason not to 
meet at the time the teacher requires. When the student acquiesces there is still a 
unification of wills and still a sense in which mutual deliberation occurs, that deliberation 
can only result in the student abandoning a previously endorsed principle, however. 
Despite Korsgaard's brevity I think her evaluation is correct. 
 However, as Korsgaard indicates, this is a bit extreme of the teacher. There does 
seem to be a middle ground: "I could take your reasons into account, not as public 
reasons with normative implications for me, but as private ones with normative 
implications for you, implications which bear on my predictions of how you are going to 
act."
30
 Korsgaard has a somewhat winding argument for why interactions cannot involve 
this sort of approach. I see no reason not to grant her claim, given that she takes 
interaction to be a kind of cooperative action and if she shows that cooperative action is 
the default for agency, then it won't matter what we call it: the default will be treating 
others’ reasons as normative. However, I describe this middle-ground approach to 
negotiations because it is the last vestige of the private reasoner that Korsgaard considers 
as a live possibility. By the time Korsgaard begins her final argument for the publicity of 
reasons, she is considering the following option: the advocate of private reasons admits 
that, yes, when engaging in cooperation agents must mutually take their reasons as 
normative and thus share their reasons with one another but surely it's the case that I can 
still choose to cooperate or not. After all, then, it is a matter of choice whether or not I 
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count others reasons as normative for me and so reasons aren't public: they are private 
but, perhaps, shareable when we decide to unite our wills in a cooperative enterprise.
31
 
 Korsgaard's argument against the optional nature of shared reasons rests on an 
argument that the act of identifying with a principle you have willed requires respecting 
one's own humanity and that 'humanity' is not a private thing such that one could respect 
it only in one's self, in some sort of private fashion. In arguing this, she appeals to issues 
in both the first and second steps of her argument: agential unity at a time requires a 
commitment to a principle that can be borne out across agents and that from the 
standpoint of one's bare agency, someone capable of reflectively endorsing principles or 
one's humanity, there is no way of picking out a particular 'me' in contrast to 'you' that 
would restrict my respect for humanity.  
 Let's consider the first part of this argument. Korsgaard has already argued that all 
action involves interaction. So she returns to the scenario of the Russian nobleman, who 
must either coerce his future self or cooperate with it, unifying his will with it, in order to 
carry out his maxim though only one of these options will allow the Russian nobleman to 
truly act in a diachronic manner. At the culmination of her argument, Korsgaard appeals 
to the diachronic case in order to show that interaction, which she has argued requires 
respect for humanity and therefore volitional unity, cannot be opted out of if we are to act 
at all. It is only through cooperating that we are capable of carrying out an action. Thus, 
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Korsgaard thinks that in order to act at all, we have to legislate publicly and endorse 
maxims in a way that treats their reasons as normative for other agents. If the Russian 
nobleman does not treat his reason as normative for his future self, as a law, then 
Korsgaard argues the Russian nobleman can't possibly be respecting his own humanity. 
This is because one's humanity is one's status as an agent capable of legislating about 
reasons in the first place. But this normativity must be public; otherwise the Russian 
nobleman cannot unify himself under it, whether at a time or across time. However, 
because the normativity of reasons is public it is not just the young Russian nobleman 
who legislates. If the older nobleman is rational, he also legislates with just as much 
normative authority. As a result, if the young nobleman is not committed to seeing his 
older self as rationally incompetent, he must respect the reasons he anticipates his older 
self to have. As Korsgaard puts it, he must either be at war with his older self or married 
to it.
32
 
 Korsgaard is now making a different argument than the argument she initially 
made to support her claim that the categorical imperative is constitutive of agency, which 
instead leads to the conclusion that agency requires public reasons in the sense that those 
reasons are binding to later selves despite sharing the same basic appeal to the need for 
cooperation in diachronic agency. We might imagine the private reasoner resisting: 
certainly the young nobleman could treat his older selves' reasons as normative but that's 
up to the young nobleman. But the young nobleman doesn't have to. The twist in the 
diachronic case that Korsgaard adds is an appeal to humanity. Korsgaard wants to argue 
that the right the young nobleman has to form a will of his own depends on treating 
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himself with respect, and treating himself with respect means treating his older self with 
respect.  
 So the situation is something like this: why not think that the private reasoner is 
committed to endorsing principles when acting but not to endorsing them publicly, that is 
as normative for her later selves? Well, she certainly must treat it as normative for her 
now. On what basis does she treat it as normative for her now? Because she respects her 
humanity, she treats herself as having a legitimate claim to legislating normativity into 
existence through volition. Two results are supposed to follow: most straightforwardly, 
inasmuch as she regards her future selves as also possessing humanity and thereby 
capable of volitional legislation, her respect for their humanity follows from a respect for 
her own humanity. Respecting hers but disrespecting theirs would be an inconsistency, 
and worse, incoherent according to Korsgaard. That would require distinguishing 
different 'possessors' of humanity, but from the deliberative standpoint Korsgaard has 
established that there is no 'I' or 'You' since no principles are as yet endorsed and so no 
agents are constituted. Thus, she must at least treat her future selves’ reasons as 
normative for her. Less straightforwardly, since she recognizes that the humanity of her 
future selves warrants their legislation over her will she also recognizes that her humanity 
warrants her legislation over their will. However, the legislation of a will must ultimately 
be unified, or no action is possible. Thus, mutual recognition of reasons is necessary in 
order to arrive at a will that is not inconsistent with itself.  
 The result is that, as I have gestured at above, in a certain sense Korsgaard thinks 
all interaction is like marriage or friendship, at least inasmuch as it requires a certain 
volitional attitude of reciprocity: "friends exchange their private projects of pursuing their 
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own happiness, each undertaking to care for the other's happiness instead of his own."
33
 
Now, this is not a reciprocity that can be strictly understood as a kind of mutual self-
effacement aiming at another's good because on Korsgaard's picture friendship is going to 
result in the formation of a unified will: "I pledge myself to pursue my friend's happiness, 
but her happiness in turn includes my own; she pledges herself to pursue my happiness, 
but mine now includes hers."
34
 Preserved in the relationship is also the commitment to 
one's own happiness, albeit only through this reciprocal relationship. Korsgaard thinks, 
therefore, that "the exchange produces something new, a shared object, our happiness."
35
 
This is the structure of interaction for Korsgaard, not just for friendship or marriage, but 
for any interaction I undertake with another agent. Since it is central to Korsgaard's 
argument that interaction is necessary, this means that diachronic interaction is also 
something like friendship or marriage: it involves a mutual commitment to each other's 
projects
36
. It is also a shared deliberation.  
 The structure of this account of volition thus underlies the fact that Korsgaard 
specifically insists in Chapter 4 (the first step of her argument) that maxims take the form 
of provisionally universal laws. A provisionally universal law is a law with a universal 
form but which incorporates exceptions into itself. To reiterate Korsgaard’s example 
formulation of a provisionally universal law: "I commit myself to acting as this maxim 
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specifies -- going to the dentist on the occasion of my appointment --... so long as I still 
have both the cavity and the appointment, and unless there is a good reason why not.”37 
Korsgaard compares this to the provisional nature of our workaday understanding of 
physical laws
38
, which we stipulate in a provisional manner and revise with a greater 
degree of specificity after observing exceptions
39
. However, the provisional nature of 
maxims has its source in the structure of cooperative action. Since this structure involves 
shared deliberation, deliberation with shared reasons, it is best to understand the 
provisional status of maxims as accounting for potential changes in the normative 
landscape that would call for renegotiation of the maxim. With a physical law, future 
experiences might make us realize the inadequacy of our formulation as a description of 
the world or as a predictor of future events. With the laws of our will, what we might fail 
to anticipate are reasons we have yet to consider or encounter that would lead us to revise 
our deliberation.  
 This comes out most clearly in the case of diachronic action. If the binding force 
of an agent’s maxim derives from a respect for humanity, that is to say the legislative 
authority present in any reflective agent, then when legislating it seems like an agent 
can’t just dictate to her future selves how to act. She must also take into consideration her 
future selves’ reasons, just as the reason she brings into being with the willing of her 
maxim must be taken on by future selves. This non-dictatorial, yet legislative attitude 
finds expression in the provisionality of maxims. 
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 Yet, there is a tension. Korsgaard wants the universality of maxims to explain the 
way in which our volitions are binding for our future selves. Inasmuch as maxims are 
laws, they keep us committed to a determinate principle of action and avoid leaving us a 
disorganized bundle of impulses. Hence the manner in which Korsgaard gives the 
provisionally universal form of willed maxims through the clause ‘unless there is a good 
reason why not.’ After all, “we are aware that certain unexpected circumstances could 
arise, circumstances that would give us good reason not to do it.”40 Important here is the 
distinction between good and bad reasons not to follow through on the action. If there 
aren’t bad reasons to avoid going to the dentist, then the maxim no longer amounts to any 
sort of commitment. Korsgaard is insistent that the structure of volition is commitment, 
that commitment requires determinacy and that, therefore, I am not willing if "all I am 
doing on Monday when I commit myself to going to the dentist on Tuesday is 
committing myself to doing whatever I will decide to do on Tuesday regardless of my 
decision on Monday."
41
 I am going to argue that Korsgaard cannot both think that we 
commit in this manner and that reasons are public in the sense that she has argued. This 
has more significant consequences than the construction of more theoretical scaffolding 
in order to distinguish how we reason diachronically, in an intrapersonal manner, rather 
than synchronically in an interpersonal manner. Korsgaard appeals to the diachronic case 
in her final argument for the publicity of reasons: our reasons must be public, binding 
universally, in order for us to undertake diachronic action. If the kind of interaction I 
have with future selves occupying my body is different in significant ways from the kind 
of interaction I have with other selves in other bodies then she can no longer 
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straightforwardly appeal to the diachronic case in order to establish the publicity of 
reasons in the interpersonal case. 
 The idea, then, is that the agent initially willing the maxim anticipates that their 
future self might have good reason for acting otherwise, but still stipulates what would be 
a bad reason to opt out. If this is the picture of the provisionally universal form of the 
maxims we will and, therefore, of the way we unify our wills with others cooperatively 
there are complications for Korsgaard's account. In the next and final section I will 
explore these difficulties by looking at diachronic cases of cooperation. Before I begin I 
want to make clear what is at stake in the following section. The aim will be to 
understand in what sense, if any, Korsgaard can preserve the determinacy of particular 
commitments such as expressed in volitions to make visits to the dentist, while still 
arguing that we must reason publicly. Here is the difficulty we will be concerned with: 
Korsgaard argues that interaction requires the unification of the will with those we 
interact with, requiring a kind of shared deliberation; Korsgaard also argues that in order 
to act at all, we must interact with future selves occupying our body, unifying our wills 
with them; because we are neither omniscient nor prescient, we do not know what our 
future self's will would be; the only way we can secure the possibility of volitional 
unification, then, is either for the past self to let the future self decide or for the future self 
to let the past self decide; if the future self must let the past self decide, then it must be 
because of a constitutive norm of action; if it cannot be established that the past self has 
authority over the future self as a result of constitutive norms of action, then the past self 
must let the future self decide; the past self letting the future self decide requires an 
abandonment of the determinate commitment Korsgaard describes in Chapter IV and thus 
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requires rejecting the treatment of our past volitions as peremptorily binding. My main 
purpose is to work through a tension that ultimately amounts to an inconsistency in 
Korsgaard’s argument in Self-Constitution, albeit one which I do not think ultimately 
prevents Korsgaard’s account from being coherent. Since I will argue that it is not a 
constitutive norm of agency that our volitions be commitments, I will also have shown 
that Korsgaard can jettison those claims without undermining her account of agency. 
However, those that find Korsgaard’s ability to account for something like the stability of 
intention important, especially as support for her account of volition, will find the 
arguments in Chapter IV thereby weakened. 
VII. Anticipating Reasons 
 Consider Korsgaard's example of the student and teacher trying to coordinate a 
meeting. In the version where the teacher acts as a private reasoner, the teacher tells the 
student to simply skip the class which conflicts with the proposed meeting time. She is 
not treating the student's reason not to skip class as a reason when scheduling the 
meeting. Now let's put a different spin on the scenario: the teacher is not reasoning 
privately, and thus does treat some of the student's reasons as good ones. Suppose the 
student has to pick up her siblings from school, and so the teacher suggests a different 
time. The teacher takes that to be a good reason not to meet at the suggested time. 
However, the teacher does not consider competing classes to be good defeaters in their 
shared practical deliberations. She proposes a maxim, dictating when they will meet, and 
stipulates that competing classes are bad reasons to opt out of the action proposed by the 
maxim. 
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 On the other hand, this scenario seems consistent with Korsgaard's description of 
the way we commit ourselves to a determinate course of action through volition. She 
seems to treat the intrapersonal diachronic case distinctly from the interpersonal case. 
Yet, to do so seems in conflict with how she describes the public nature of reasons: it is 
not up to the teacher to simply discount certain reasons the student has and likewise in the 
intrapersonal case of the Russian Nobleman. The teacher cannot disrespect the humanity 
in her student that allows her to legislate reasons nor can the young nobleman disregard 
the reasons of his older self. Presumably, the teacher/young nobleman can only discount 
the student's/old nobleman’s reasons if they can't be legislated from the standpoint of 
humanity at all, that is to say: they are immoral
42
. However, Korsgaard seems to describe 
the stipulations made in maxims as to what might be good or bad reasons not to go to the 
dentist in this dictatorial manner: one stipulates that being afraid is a bad reason. It is 
clear that this can't be what one does, strictly speaking, for to do so would be to fail to 
reason publicly: if fear is a reason for my future self then I cannot fail to treat it as a 
reason. The examples Korsgaard gives of 'bad reasons' in the case of the trip to the dentist 
do not seem like they need to be immoral. Backing out of dentist trips due to anxiety or 
fear may produce a less pleasant world when universalized, but there doesn't appear to be 
any contradiction in willing such a maxim universally. Perhaps they would, but due the 
ambiguity with which Korsgaard presents examples it is still an open question whether 
the provisional universality of a maxim is constrained by morality or by something more 
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 Korsgaard takes morality to fall out of the public status of reasons. Reasons are public because when I 
legislate (or when anyone legislates) the resulting reasons become normative for all humanity. But certain 
actions can't be willed for all humanity because they produce a contradiction in the will when legislated 
from this standpoint. I will be presuming that Korsgaard has successfully argued for public reasons and, 
therefore, morality. Since my concerns are with the internal coherence of her arguments, she or a defender 
could appeal to morality without begging the question or reasoning in a circular manner.  
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particular, like our practical identities. The latter certainly seems to fit one sense in which 
we often take ourselves to think of how we're committed. As a teacher, one might not 
think that a cold is sufficient reason not to be teaching, while perhaps an auditor might 
think that a cold is a good reason for not attending class. It is not necessarily a matter of 
morality for the teacher, though it might be. It could just be a part of her sense of 
commitment to her students. 
 One way to characterize this commitment is to think of it in terms of a certain 
kind of authority, albeit one that only results from an agreement to a particular way of 
conducting one's self. As I mentioned earlier when discussing the student/teacher 
negotiation over when to meet, the student might just unify wills with the teacher, thereby 
making it possible to interact by ceding authority to the teacher to make the decision of 
when to meet and regarding what reasons are good or bad ones for meeting at particular 
times. Of course, the teacher can't expect the student to do this unless she has a legitimate 
claim, in both their eyes, to this sort of authority. That is to say both must reflectively 
endorse the teacher's status as authoritative in this manner.  
 Appealing to a policy like this in the diachronic case seems like a way to preempt 
the concern about the tension the deliberating self is in when legislating for its future self. 
We might argue that in the case of diachronic action, the deliberating self has a claim to 
authority over the reasons of the future self. The argument might run something like this: 
we need commitment in order to have volition. We need volition in order to act. The only 
way to get commitment is if I cede authority to the volition of my past self. However, 
because we are first and foremost committed to public reasons and thereby committed to 
taking the reasons of all rational agents into consideration in our deliberations, in order to 
37 
 
 
 
successfully establish that this structure of diachronic mediation is warranted Korsgaard 
will need to argue that we are constitutively committed to ceding to the decisions of our 
past selves. Thus, if my future self decides not to go to the dentist because he is afraid, he 
is thereby making a mistake not just by my lights as the deliberating self, but by his own 
lights as an agent. If the argument is not made constitutively, then whether or not my 
future self decides to treat my volitions as authoritative is up to him and, as a result, I 
cannot genuinely commit him through my volitions.   
 By now we are familiar with the constitutive features of action according to 
Korsgaard: that we make ourselves into the unified causes of the ends we will. Failing to 
treat volitions of our past selves as committing us in the present must threaten the 
possibility of action, if commitment is to be possible. Here is an argument along those 
lines, given in the form of an example:  
 I find myself on Tuesday, about to go to the dentist and afraid to do so
43
. I know 
that last week I decided I was going to go to see the dentist today. Now, I have all sorts of 
decisions I myself have made. For instance, I have decided that I want to see a rare live 
show of a foreign musical group, among others. I know that I'll be counting on my future 
selves to work with me in carrying out that action. Now, I imagine a future self in my 
shoes at the time of the show: it is a foggy night out and, despite it being a short drive 
that is relatively safe, that future self is afraid to drive. I know that my decision to see the 
show will only get carried out in such a circumstance if my future self treats my volition 
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 I want to make it clear that if the agent making the decision regarding whether or not to go to the dentist 
would not be trying to will particularistically should the decision be not to go because of fear. The agent 
would will the decision as a maxim, legislating fear as a genuine and generalizing reason not to go to the 
dentist. In other words, I am not presenting a case of what Korsgaard might consider temptation. I take my 
case to be more akin to the Russian Nobleman case (assuming the Russian Nobleman's future self can be 
considered rational). 
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as committing him, and therefore cedes to me that being afraid is a bad reason not to go 
to the show. But I am also in that situation with respect to my past self's volition to go to 
the dentist. I surely cannot make an exception of myself, for from the deliberative 
standpoint my past self and I are not distinct. If I want my future self to treat my volitions 
as committing him, I must treat my past self's volition as committing me as well. If I don't 
do so, I know that my capacity to act according to my ends will be jeopardized.  
 The demand I find myself confronted with in this example is parallel to the 
demand to unify myself by willing a maxim. Just as I am faced with a set of incentives 
which I must unite under a maxim in order to constitute myself as a unified whole, across 
time I may be confronted with a set of maxims which I must unite in order to constitute 
myself as a unified whole. I can't just identify with the maxim I have at any present 
moment, not now that I am required to deliberate publicly in a diachronic fashion. 
Instead, I need to mediate between all the various maxims my future and past selves 
might will and they must do likewise. I can do this only by forming some sort of principle 
of practical deliberation either to which we all agree or which is necessary in order to 
ensure our capacity to act. We will either need to adopt a principle which coherently 
governs the way our volitions are treated across time or be constitutively governed by 
one. It appears as though if I do not treat volitions as commissive, my capacity to act is 
threatened. So in the example given, the argument is that in order to satisfy the demands 
of the constitutive norms of agency volitions must be able to peremptorily commit (i.e. 
commit me against treating certain reasons as motivating where they conflict with the 
willed act).  
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 Now, it is important to see that because of the nature of the diachronic case, if it 
turns out that the past self ceding to the future self is a viable option for conducting 
ourselves as agents, then it will be the only option. For, there is no in-between like in the 
case of an interpersonal negotiation between two people at a time where a back-and-forth 
can establish consensus without requiring any sort of asymmetry. The reason why it must 
either be the case that the future self gives say-so to the past self or vice-versa is because 
we are committed to treating our past and future selves’ reasons as normative. Now, 
suppose I find myself deliberating about how to act and I must decide whether or not I'm 
making a commitment that involves overriding certain sorts of reasons my future self 
might have, which is to say I'm treating my volition as committing me even in the face of 
these reasons. Say I commit myself to going to the dentist even if I'm afraid. My will 
must be unified with my future self's will in order to act at a future date, because 
otherwise that will be some other agent and not me. So, if my future self refuses to treat 
my volition as committing him in this manner, then it will turn out that I have made it 
impossible to unify our wills, in the same way that the teacher being dismissive of the 
student's reasons prevents shared deliberation. Put another way, I cannot antecedently 
commit my future selves to uphold my commitments. This sort of self-authorization is 
circular unless it is the only option if I am to act: it must be authorized by the constitutive 
features of agency. Not only would an attempt to antecedently commit in this way be 
problematically circular, but by failing to accord my future self the same authority to 
legislate which I accord myself in virtue of our shared humanity, I actually undermine my 
own capacity to self-constitute. Thus, if volition can peremptorily commit in the face of 
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future reasons, it is an all-or-nothing affair (which is not to suggest that the commitments 
our volitions require of us are not defeasible).  
 We can draw out the dialectic of the situation by returning to the synchronic case. 
Suppose the teacher tries to apply a similar argument: "Look," she says "We have to 
come to some decision. Neither of us is budging so I'm just going to make a decision for 
us. There's really no choice, for we must figure out some time to meet." The immediate 
retort, available to the student, is that while it may be that someone has to make a 
decision, it surely doesn't have to be the teacher. "Why can't I be the one to decide?" she 
asks. We are certainly in this sort of situation in the diachronic case: someone is going to 
have to be the authority; either the past self will have to let the future self decide, or vice-
versa. Is there a way to choose between the two? Otherwise, nothing is going to be 
decided, since they cannot reach out across time in order to negotiate actively.  
 Here is the answer that the past self will want to give as to why it is not the future 
self that can be the authority: suppose I let you, the future self, decide rather than vice-
versa. Well, that would mean that I could not commit to anything. I might come to a final 
conclusion about what seems best for me to do at this particular moment but I could not 
really commit to any diachronically extended action, such as going to the dentist next 
Tuesday. Not only that, but neither could you, for you are also past self with respect to 
some future self. So you would really have to leave it to some future self to decide 
whether or not to carry out your decisions. And so the chain goes: you cede to him and he 
cedes to his future self and none of us form any commitments to do anything and so none 
of us really act. On the other hand, if you let me decide then a similar chain occurs, but 
one which strengthens our capacity to accomplish our goals. For you are a past self with 
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respect to some future self, and therefore in a position to commit that future self in the 
same way I commit you. Granted, many circumstances which we might not anticipate 
may lead us to reasonably abandon our commitment, but at least we would be committed 
to acting when things go as expected.  
 Now, the picture the past self paints of a world in which volitions commit us 
across time is certainly an appealing one in certain respects and may seem preferable to a 
world in which the deliberating self never commits its future selves. In this world, the 
past self leaves decisions about action at later times to the future self, which undermines 
the determinacy of our particular commitments, or so it would appear. The question of 
primary interest is whether or not this indeterminacy of commitment leads to some sort of 
incapacity to act effectively. The cost of self-governing in a manner which does not treat 
volitions as commissive is, presumably, that we lose the authority to set ends for 
ourselves in a manner that allows us to pursue them efficaciously as agents across time. 
The trade-off is that my past self has no say about what new ends I set at the present 
moment. In a sense, the tension between the two is something like this: if volitions are 
commissive, we give up our deliberative authority to set ends for ourselves as a result of 
our present evaluation of the reasons that motivate us. If volitions are not commissive, we 
find our capacity to pursue the ends we do set in virtue of being unable to maintain them 
in the face of redeliberation that we anticipate. We can here see that the issues of 
deliberative autonomy and agential efficacy begin to come apart in a way that Korsgaard 
does not consider. It is essential, however, to examine which is more fundamental to her 
account of agency and to establish how we mediate our deliberations with our future and 
past selves. I will now proceed to weigh the costs to the agential norms of autonomy and 
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efficacy in these two alternatives for diachronic mediation, beginning with the case in 
which our volitions peremptorily commit us in the manner Korsgaard suggests.  
 One thing to be concerned about if volitions peremptorily commit us is that what 
counts as a mistaken practical deliberation is determined only in terms of diachronic 
relations between agents. To illustrate this, I will suggest two scenarios: in one, I have 
tooth-pain, consider going to the dentist and decide that I am very afraid of dentists and 
that I’m not going to go. Now, as time passes this volition will commit my future selves. 
Suppose I even stipulate that increased pain would be a bad reason to go to the dentist. 
Later, as the pain becomes unbearable, I feel inclined to go to the dentist. Yet, I must 
accede to my past self’s volition: I must not go to the dentist. However, in the second 
scenario, when I first deliberate I instead decide that the pain is a good reason to go to the 
dentist, and my fear a bad reason not to go. In this scenario, my later self is bound by my 
volition in the precise opposite way, even as the fear intensifies.
44
 Outside of the 
authority of our past volitions, however, there are no grounds for being mistaken in our 
commitments to our maxim. If volitions commit us in this manner, it seems that they 
have a very powerful and largely arbitrary say in constituting what would be a mistaken 
practical judgment.  
 While most of us probably would find at least some of these decisions quite 
different from the ones we would be inclined to make, there are no constraints in the 
resources available to Korsgaard to exclude them. The priorities that our reasons have are 
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 One might wonder in what sense I could be the same person and be capable of, hypothetically, making 
completely opposite judgments about how I want to act. Of course, from the deliberative standpoint 
Korsgaard is committed to not distinguishing between agents at all and, further, to the freedom of the agent 
to self-constitute. One might also want to consider just how consistent people are about the way they weigh 
considerations from situation to situation.  
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totally dependent on the capacities of our deliberating self to stipulate them in its volition 
and on the stipulations it in fact makes. The result is that we can only be procedurally 
mistaken when we form practical judgments that conflict with judgments expressed in the 
volitions of our past selves. This is, of course, consistent with Korsgaard’s account of the 
norms of agency if we suppose that volitions are commissive as a constitutive feature of 
agency: the norms that govern agency for Korsgaard are procedural or formal norms.  
 The difficulty with this picture of agency is the way in which it leaves the future 
self at the mercy of the past self. Sometimes we feel like our past self was in some way 
failing to appreciate the reasons we have, even if they anticipated the situation we find 
ourselves in. The perspective through which we are appreciating even the reasons our 
past self anticipated is one that self could not have occupied, so why should it be able to 
dismiss our perspective? If past volitions do not commit us, we have to give up our right 
to demand our future selves carry through the ends we set ourselves. But if we treat past 
volitions as able to commit us by preempting our reasons, we give up our right to 
exercise our capacities to reflectively endorse the courses of action we take
45
. Perhaps the 
weirdness of this structure of diachronic rationality can be made clearer if look at a case 
where the past self has infinite cognitive capacities, such that they can consider every 
possible reason to abandon the commitment, and therefore establishes entirely in advance 
the contours of the commitment. The result would be that this past self could definitively 
and for all time determine how its future selves would be rationally bound to act, even 
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 Even if we want to insist on the right to redeliberate it doesn’t mean we have to exercise it. The issue 
about whether it is resource-efficient or wise to always redeliberate has nothing to do with whether or not 
volitions have authority in the face of redeliberation.  
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though its commitment could have taken any number of mutually incompatible forms and 
therefore would be, in a certain sense, arbitrary.  
 The case of the cognitively infinite agent also draws out just how drastic the 
distinction between intrapersonal and interpersonal cases would have to be. After all, 
Korsgaard’s arguments for the publicity of reason definitely commit her to the view that 
being able to anticipate and plan out our volitions for all future circumstances does not 
allow us to preempt the reasons of agents in other bodies. Yet, supposedly, the 
relationship I have to my future and past selves are the same as the relationships I have 
with other agents in other bodies, with the exception of the diachronic asymmetries 
confronting me in the former cases. It does not seem convincing that the structure of 
diachronic reasoning can warrant the sort of procedural constraints on diachronic 
practical rationality that have just been outlined. Indeed, something here seems to go 
against the whole spirit of the reasoning which was supposed justify the authority of our 
past volitions to commit us: it was as a part of a broader policy of mediation between past 
and future selves where each self traded full authority over its present course of action in 
order to secure the stability of the pursuit of the ends it sets across time. There must be 
more to the story of this mediation, then, since the case of the cognitively infinite 
deliberating self simply seems to annihilate any independence its future selves might 
have, thus making it an empty question whether or not those future selves ought to heed 
the deliberating selves’ volitions in order to increase their efficacy. However, it seems 
uncertain that Korsgaard will have the resources to flesh out this story and how that 
would play out. There would need to be boundaries on the deliberating self’s authority to 
deliberate for its future selves, but how those constraints would be established seems 
45 
 
 
 
difficult to ascertain. After all, they cannot be negotiated between selves. Furthermore, 
we cannot appeal to a principle in which the deliberating self must somehow respect the 
autonomy of the future self. For one thing, this leaves the question as to what degree the 
future self needs, minimally, to retain its autonomy. For another (and more 
problematically), the entire argument justifying the authority of our past volitions to 
commit us establishes that it is constitutive of the capacity of the future self to be an 
agent that it accept the commitments of its past selves. Thus, the commitments are not 
alien constraints on the autonomy of the future self to begin with.   
 Now that we have explored the case in which volitions peremptorily commit us, 
we can consider whether or not volition which does not commit us peremptorily 
undermines action. Is such an agent hindered in pursuing its ends? The answer is less 
clear when we consider that, bound by the need to reason publicly, the agent whose 
volitions do not peremptorily commit her sets her ends to be her best judgment about 
what she ought to pursue at any given time. Her long-term ends (insofar as she is 
committed to them) are indeterminate but she is not especially hindered in pursuing them 
and can do so until some deliberation leads her to believe that they need adjusting. 
Furthermore, they likely have some degree of persistence since we are unlikely, for 
reasons of economy, to redeliberate all our ends at all moments. Furthermore, our past 
volitions still carry weight as public reasons that will bind us in our deliberations. They 
just do not peremptorily bind us.  
 There does seem to be one thing missing if volitions do not commit us: a general 
policy for how to unite our maxims into a coherent and unified will. The demand to 
accede to past volitions at least gives us a concrete way to adjudicate between our past 
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and present judgments. Otherwise, how is one supposed to decide whether or not my 
present judgment, which may conflict with a past judgment, is mistaken or correct? 
Actually, this question is just as pertinent to the agent who is bound by past volitions. As 
a result of our finite cognitive capacities, our ability to commit through anticipation of 
future circumstances is very limited. In many cases, we're just going to have to fly by the 
seat of our pants
46
. The difference between an agent governed by volitions that 
peremptorily bind and an agent governed by volitions that don’t is that the latter simply 
flies by the seat of her pants all the time. However, we are no more undermined in our 
capacity to act diachronically when we encounter unanticipated circumstances than when 
we encounter anticipated ones.  
Finally, approaching the relationship that I have to my past self's practical 
judgments in terms of correctness or incorrectness is simply mistaken itself, even if my 
practical judgments are the exact opposite of my past self's. It is mistaken in the same 
way that when we enter into shared deliberations with someone with competing practical 
judgments, we must assume that one of us is wrong. Inasmuch as Korsgaard is a 
constructivist, so long as those judgments are formed according to the constraints of 
agency, they are legitimate. It is clear that there is a great deal of wiggle-room to legislate 
in the sphere of the non-moral, such that two legitimate but competing judgments could 
occur. Indeed, on Korsgaard’s account our practical judgments are acts of self-
constitution in the face of the incentives and reasons we find ourselves faced with, not 
                                                 
46
 The exception, of course, would be if we were cognitively infinite and capable of planning for every 
instance. See above for discussion of such a case. 
47 
 
 
 
judgments about the reasons we have
47
. When we encounter someone with competing 
judgments, we are both of us forced to find some way to mediate them and form a new 
judgment about how we are to act together while according each other's reasons weight. 
In other words, we are to self-constitute as a new agent, acting together toward whatever 
we decide is our common end. With that said, it's clear that if volition is non-commissive 
there is a principle guiding this mediating process. It is a kind of division of labor, akin to 
a relay race, in which each agent takes care of practical judgment and action at her time 
by taking into account the balance of reasons her past selves and circumstances have left 
her with. Yet, just as we can all effectively run a relay race together despite only running 
a portion of it individually, the agent  whose volitions are non-commissive is capable of 
diachronic action as a whole in virtue of the fact that most fundamentally, every agent is 
committed to ceding to the next agent in line as time passes. The diachronic action to 
which such an agent is ultimately committed is just much more general than the particular 
actions she engages in at any given time.  
 If volitions are peremptorily binding, we are enabled as agents to be efficacious in 
the pursuit of particular ends. If volitions are not peremptorily binding, we are enabled as 
agents to exercise the legislative authority of our humanity unhindered. Actually, this 
evaluation of both cases is mistaken. Neither constitutive feature of agency is undermined 
in either case. If volitions are treated as commissive, then they are only commissive as a 
result of a constitutive need to endorse them as such, which means that it is constitutive 
of an act of reflective endorsement that it produce a volition which will commit our 
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 Thus, one could not argue that failing to treat volitions as commissive expresses an irrational distrust for 
the deliberative capacities of one’s past self. Those deliberative capacities are only exercised in the act of 
self-constitution, which is precisely what the future self finds itself engaged in doing. Outside of the 
constitutive norms of agency, however, there are no standards of correctness for the way we self-constitute.  
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future selves. If volitions are treated as non-commissive, then I may freely pursue my 
particular ends, it is just that I do not have the authority to determine whether or not other 
agents, including my future selves, pursue those particular ends. My practical judgments 
are not voided, they are merely highly provisional, missing the direct stipulations that a 
peremptorily binding volition possesses.  In many ways, the agent governed by 
commissive volitions and the one governed by non-commissive volitions are in the same 
boat, since they both must leave their commitments open to redeliberation in the face of 
encounters with other agents they may need to enter into interpersonal cooperation with 
or in the face of circumstances that they were not able to anticipate in their practical 
deliberations.  
As I argued above, if it turns out that both commissive and non-commissive 
volition seem like viable options for diachronic self-governance, then it will turn out that 
commissive volition is never a viable option for diachronic self-governance since it is 
only such an option if it is constitutive (i.e. it is the only option). To reiterate, if 
commissive volition is not a necessary norm for agency then it may either be endorsed or 
not endorsed by later selves with whom I must cooperate in order to be able to act. It is a 
constitutive norm that I cooperate with them. Thus, if I insist on commissive volition and 
my later self disagrees, then I will have failed to cooperate and will undermine my own 
efficacy in diachronic action. The peculiar situation of separation across time in cases of 
diachronic action leads to the result that our volitions cannot take the form of 
commitment that Korsgaard describes in the first step of her argument for public reasons. 
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Conclusion 
I have attempted to show that Korsgaard’s commitment to the publicity of reasons 
is incompatible with her account of volition as determinate commitment. I think, at the 
least, I have shown that there are serious tensions between the two and that Korsgaard has 
not paid enough attention to the issues particular to diachronic agency. Perhaps this is 
because she does not think it necessary, since the unification of wills that constitutes our 
cooperation with other agents “cannot take place under the conditions of space and 
time.”48 Regardless, much elaboration is needed in order to make clear what the precise 
demands of public reasons are. This is crucial in the diachronic case, since the diachronic 
case is the case she ultimately appeals to in her argument to reasons are public. 
Furthermore, all our interactions with other agents in interpersonal cases will necessarily 
involve cooperation with future selves occupying the bodies of those involved, and so 
understanding how we reason practically in the diachronic case will affect how we reason 
in interpersonal cases.  
 The most fundamental point I have attempted to make is just this: if non-
commissive volitions undermine our capacity to act, then we must be constitutively 
committed to commissive volitions and vice-versa. This is an important point when 
considering the issue, regardless of the success of my arguments that non-commissive 
volitions do not undermine our capacity to act, at least not moreso than the many 
circumstances we are faced with which fall outside our anticipatory deliberations do so. 
At the very least, the stakes should be clear: Korsgaard needs to make further argument 
that commitment is constitutive of volition or abandon a model of diachronic agency that 
includes commitment. 
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